Report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
Working Group on Foreign Visits and Assignments (June 8, 1999)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 1999, Secretary Richardson requested that the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board form a Working Group to review the Department of Energy's Foreign Visits and Assignments program. He specifically charged the Working Group with assessing the policies and practices related to foreign visitors at the Department's laboratories, and assessing the balance between security and science.

The Foreign Visits and Assignments program administers the policies and procedures related to the presence of foreign nationals at the Department of Energy's sites. Foreign national visitors may be at a laboratory for as little as an afternoon for a meeting or tour while the stay of an assignee may extend from one month to two years. The Working Group found that the tangible and intangible benefits derived from these types of international collaborations are essential to the scientific and technological strength of the United States. Based on its review, the Working Group is confident that these types of collaborations, under the auspices of the Foreign Visits and Assignments program, can be conducted without jeopardizing national security and should be continued.

During the course of its review, the Working Group did not find that foreign visitors or assignees represent high security risks at the Department's laboratories. Although there is no known instance of a foreign visitor or assignee perpetrating espionage, there are cases of employees with security clearances compromising national security information. Measures currently being undertaken by the Department to address the highest risk areas also should provide an extra margin of protection against any potential compromises of information by visitors or assignees. In addition, the Department is making specific changes to improve the management and operation of the foreign visits and assignments program.

The Working Group examined these recent and proposed reforms to the visits and assignments program. The following selected recommendations from the report reflect this focus:

• The Working Group found that the Department's new overall management structure that aligns responsibility, accountability and resources, lends itself to the effective implementation of cross-cutting issues such as security. Within this new structure the Working Group supports the proposed delegation of responsibility to approve unclassified foreign visits and assignments to the Laboratory Directors, and to hold them accountable for those decisions. Further, the Working Group recommends that the new Office of Security and Emergency Operations be incorporated into the design and processes of the new managment structure.
• The Working Group recommends a graded approach which balances security concerns with mission objectives.
• The Working Group recommends that requirements for foreign nationals who are short term visitors be distinguished from the requirements for foreign nationals with assignments to Departmental sites. Currently the same requirements apply to both visitors and assignees. The Working Group's recommendation is that indices checks be required prior to the assignment and arrival for foreign assignees from sensitive countries to all laboratories regardless of whether or not there is classified work conducted at the site.
• The Working Group recommends that policies and procedures be drafted that are specific to foreign visitors and assignees at mult-purpose laboratories with limited classified information. The group of laboratories currently meeting this criterion are Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Brookhaven National Laboratory.
• The Working Group recommends that in lieu of creating new lists, the Department use established designations and definitions for sensitive subjects and technologies to determine where nonproliferation or export control issues may arise.

The Working Group arrived at these and other recommendations based on several findings. Among the most essential findings was that foreign nationals make a substantial contribution to this country's scientific vitality and to the Department's ability to conduct the scientific research and development that underpins its four mission areas: Energy Resources, Science, National Security and Environmental Quality.

The Department is the nation's, and indeed the world's, largest supporter of research and development in the physical sciences and engineering. However, despite their considerable research and development role, the Department's laboratories conduct only one to two percent of the world's research and development (but produce a much larger fraction of the seminal advances in facility-based and interdisciplinary research.) Thus, the effectiveness of the Department's overall efforts rests essentially on leveraging the other 98 to 99 percent of the research and development done elsewhere in the United States and abroad by industry, universities, and governments.

Collaborations with foreign governments and scientists benefit the Nation by strengthening and speeding up the scientific process, enhancing understanding and allowing nations to pool resources to fund costly projects. In some areas, such as high energy physics, the trend is toward fewer, one-of-a-kind, facilities which by necessity are open to the international scientific community for research. In addition to intellectual gains, this approach saves United States tax- payers' money through cost sharing arrangements which eliminate the need for the United States to build duplicate facilities. To derive the benefits of these collaborations, however, there is an assumption of quid pro quo access to facilities in participating countries. The Working Group concluded that reasonable access can be afforded foreign national visitors and assignees without jeopardizing national security.

Also of significance is the Department's non-proliferation program with the Russian government which is totally dependent on collaboration among Russian and United States scientists and technicians. This program includes securing and safeguarding Russian nuclear materials which are of potential use for weapons, and the safe and secure dismantling of nuclear warheads. In addition, the Department supports employment alternatives for Russian scientists with expertise in weapons of mass destruction. This program keeps unemployed and under-employed Russian scientists away from jobs in countries that have or are developing nuclear capabilities.

International collaborations also contribute to the Department's ability to attract and retain the world's top scientists and engineers at its laboratories. The loss of these scientists, engineers and experts would have serious long-term implications for national security and economic well-being. Additionally, the prospect of severely restricting access to international experts would disadvantage the Department as it competes with industry, universities and other countries to hire the top scientific and technological minds.

The issue is not whether the Department has sound policies to protect information vital to national security; sound policies exist. The issue is whether the Department has the sound management practices necessary to consistently implement those policies over time. The Department must manage in a way that instills in each employee a sense of responsibility for protecting national security information. Its management approach also should accommodate the Working Group's finding that 'one size does not fit all' laboratories in terms of security plans. In fact, at some laboratories' managers must contend with different security needs within the site where classified research and large user facilities are both located on the grounds.

The Laboratory Operations Board, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and other groups have reviewed and provided findings and recommendations on how the Department could better manage its programs. The Working Group believes the Department's security concerns represent another example of the management challenges the Department faces. The Department of Energy now has in place security reforms related to physical systems, cyber systems, and human systems which will operate to protect against compromises in national security. However, as with any reform, the key to effectiveness resides with the management system to consistently implement them in such a way that the laboratories can fully engage in scientific pursuits in an environment which both protects national security and reaps the benefits from the contribution of foreign visitors and assignees.

June 8,1999