Report of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
Working Group on Foreign Visits and Assignments

Findings and Recommendations

As a basic principle, the Working Group recommends security requirements be dictated by the level of risk posed by specific locations, not the fact that classified information or work may exist elsewhere onsite.

• The Working Group recommends a graded approach which balances security concerns with missions objectives.
• The Working Group recommends that a distinct set of policies and specific procedures be drafted for foreign visitors and assignees at multi-purpose laboratories with limited classified information. The laboratories currently meeting this criterion of limited classified materials are Argonne National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Brookhaven National Laboratory.
• The Working Group recommends that the Counterintelligence Implementation Plan be revised to include Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory among the laboratories exempt from the requirement for prior indices checks on visitors from all sensitive countries. The basis for this recommendation is that there is no classified research at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

The Working Group recognizes that the Department is undertaking reform of its security programs. As with any reform, the Working Group believes the key to effectiveness is the management system. The Working Group found that the design of the recently adopted Departmental management structure lends itself to effective implementation of cross-cutting issues such as security and allows the Secretary to ensure the clear alignment of responsibility and accountability for security.

Within the context of this new structure, the Working Group supports the proposed delegation of responsibility to approve unclassified foreign visits and assignments to the Laboratory Directors, and to hold them accountable for those decisions. Further, the Working Group recommends that the new Office of Security and Emergency Operations be incorporated into the design and processes of the new management structure.

Further, the Working Group recommends that the new Field Management Council, established as part of the recent management reforms, be the vehicle used to review and approve draft policies and procedures for these multi-purpose laboratories.

The Working Group recommends that there be separate policies for foreign visitors and foreign assignees. Specifically, it suggests that prior indices checks for all assignees from sensitive countries be required, as well as for assignees from any country who will have access to sensitive areas, unless exempted by the Atomic Energy Act.

The Working Group believes existing designations, definitions for sensitive subjects and technologies and the associated security regimes are appropriate and sufficient, and that Department does not require a separate and unique approach from that utilized by other federal agencies.

June 8,1999