The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board -
Minutes from the Thirteenth Plenary, November 1996

Introduction

Mr. Robert Hanfling, Chairman of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB), convened the public meeting at 5:00 PM EDT on November 4, 1996. He pointed out that this was the first SEAB meeting by teleconference, and asked the Board members present to identify themselves. After introducing Mr. David Cheney, Executive Director of the SEAB, as the designated federal officer, Mr. Hanfling outlined the agenda, and stated that the primary purpose of the meeting was to discuss whether to approve the Letter Report from the Task Force on the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Implications of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Disposition Alternatives. The meeting was then turned over to Dr. Allen Sessoms, Chairman of the Task Force.

Dr. Sessoms said that the Task Force found the Department's Assessment to be an accurate, complete, and objective comparison of the relative strengths and weaknesses, from both technical and public policy standpoints, of the alternatives currently under consideration by the Department. He praised DOE officials for acting reasonably and cooperatively in incorporating Task Force comments into the Assessment. He emphasized that, from the beginning, the Task Force strove for consensus in its comments and recommendations.

Dr. Sessoms explained that the question of what to do with the growing stockpiles of fissile material has recently become an issue of greater prominence due to several factors: the end of the Cold War, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the implementation of the START I Treaty, and the ensuing dismantlement of thousands of nuclear warheads in Russia and the U.S. Together, these factors serve as the backdrop for an issue for which no formal treaty has been signed.

Dr. Sessoms stated that the current state of disarray in Russia's nuclear facilities, the possible infiltration of Russian facilities by black market operatives, the inadequacy of worker pay, and deficiencies in the safeguard and security measures at some of the facilities, are particular areas of concern. The potential consequences of a sub-national group obtaining any fissile material underscores the primacy of the problem, and the need to safeguard these materials as soon as possible. He emphasized that whichever option(s) the U.S. chooses for disposition, it must take Russian considerations into account. He then provided a summary of the major issues and recommendations raised by the Task Force in the letter report.

Summary of the Task Force Report

1) Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium is essential.

2) A Fast Start on Weapon Plutonium Disposition is important.

• An early start is necessary to ensure worldwide credibility, and to influence the Russians into taking reciprocal measures.
• The mixed-oxide fuel (MOx) option, in particular, has the greatest potential for an early start. Europe and Japan currently use MOx fuel, despite the historical U.S. policy of not encouraging the civilian use of MOx fuel. If the U.S. were to build MOx facilities, Russia would take reciprocal actions, which would coincide with our goal of encouraging the Russians to take action as quickly as possible
• Although Pu-burning is currently against U.S. policy, the Task Force believes that national security imperatives justify the building of MOx facilities in the U.S., and burning plutonium in reactors for the designated purpose of fissile material disposition, particularly since no reprocessing would occur.

3) International Safeguards should be applied early.

• It begins the irreversibility process, and enhances credibility.
• It makes it difficult to divert materials, and resolves some Carter era concerns about proliferation.

4) Physical Security is Important

• Weapons physical security standards should be applied to distinguish the materials from commercial fuel standards.
• A distinction was made between weapons-grade plutonium and the plutonium in commercial spent fuel
• The "Stored Weapon Standard" is expensive, but may be appropriate due to proliferation concerns. The "Spent Fuel Standard" was noted as the minimum criterion.

5) Irreversibility is Essential

• Vitrification, in itself, is not sufficient to ensure recovery of plutonium will not occur. Burning plutonium as MOx in reactors destroys the isotopic purity of the weapons-grade material, and provides the perception of irreversibility.
• Public must feel confident that the option chosen is irreversible.

6) Plutonium Recycle Concerns Can Be Reduced

• Use of MOx in the U.S. would occur only for the disposition of plutonium. There would be no change in U.S. civilian fuel cycle policy; i.e., the fuel cycle would not be "closed" because there would be no reprocessing for plutonium recovery.
• This is a matter of national security, not a change in the fuel cycle policy, particularly if the MOx facilities are located at government facilities. The facilities should be dismantled after the disposition mission has been completed.

7) Borehole Alternative not credible near- or medium-term option

• The borehole option, even with vitrified plutonium, is not credible. Dr. Sessoms described the improbability of the borehole option as analogous to the difficulties associated with licensing Yucca Mountain for the long-term storage of high level nuclear waste; i.e. the Not-In-My-BackYard (NIMBY) problem.
• Longer term geological disposition of spent fuel and defense wastes will be required.

Discussion

Mr. Butler Derrick questioned the political viability of importing plutonium, even in a MOx form, from Europe. Dr. Sessoms responded that the national security imperative of disposing of fissile materials should be emphasized, and that European facilities would be used only until the U.S. had licensed and built its own. Ms. Cheryl Alexander expressed concern about the timelines associated with obtaining a license.

Mr. Bryan Pipes and Ms. Maxine Savitz expressed concern that the Russians would not be able to afford MOx or vitrification facilities. In addition, whichever disposition option(s) is chosen, the investment would amount to billions of dollars, and many non-weapons states would not be willing to fund a solution to "a problem which they did not create." It was also pointed out that the Russians have no intention of vitrifying their plutonium, since they see economic value in using the material for fuel.

The Board members also expressed concern that European utilities would be unwilling to underwrite the disposal costs of Russian plutonium, since the Russians would charge a premium far above the plutonium's value as fuel. Dr. Sessoms reiterated his belief that the national security imperatives of the disposing of fissile material will need to be emphasized in order to obtain support from the American public. He also pointed out that the U.S. is already paying for Russia to build safe storage facilities for some of their fissile materials.

Mr. Dan Dudek inquired about the economics associated with disposal. Dr. Sessoms asserted that plutonium fuel is not competitive with LWR fuel, and referenced the Sandia Red Team Report (also referenced in the DOE study) which advocates increased appropriations by the U.S. Congress for physical security upgrades at Russian nuclear facilities. Dr. Sessoms pointed out that other offices at DOE have been tasked with cost-benefit analysis, whereas the SEAB Task Force and the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation were asked to concentrate specifically on the nonproliferation aspects of fissile material disposition.

Mr. Paul Miskimin stated that a particular set of U.S. rules governs the transport of plutonium when it is not encased in a weapon, which may require that the material be classified as a weapon until it arrives at a processing facility. Thus, he reasoned, there are two problems associated with this task: 1) getting the plutonium out of Russia, and 2) transporting/disposing of it in the United States. He also indicated that since the U.S. is disposing of high-level nuclear waste via vitrification, it would probably make sense to dispose of plutonium that way as well. Dr. Sessoms replied that Russia has repeatedly stated its opposition to the vitrification of plutonium, as well as the transfer of plutonium to the U.S.; Russia may be willing to sell some plutonium to the U.S., but for a steep price. Moreover, selling plutonium would raise a concern in Russia that the U.S. was acquiring an advantage in its plutonium stock. This would be in opposition to the current envisioned plan of reducing plutonium stocks in both countries in parallel, and therefore is highly unlikely. He also stated that the American public would most likely protest U.S. funding of an expensive disposal facility in Russia.

Mr. Mark Murphy pointed out that no disposition option has a "cradle to grave" advantage in terms of time schedule -- each option will take at least 20-25 years -- and whereas the Russians are against vitrification of their plutonium, it is not any easier for the U.S., from a cost or time standpoint, to build a MOx facility. Some of the Russian problems with vitrification can be solved with isotopic conversion in a reactor. Mr. Murphy asked how quickly the current stockpiles of plutonium could be burned as MOx, with the present number of civilian reactors available worldwide. Dr. Sessoms responded that the hybrid option (plutonium burned as MOx, and then vitrified) is a complex issue, and that it would most likely take around 15 years to build a MOx plant in the U.S. Thus, the U.S. should use existing MOx facilities in Europe and declare the building of a MOx plant in the U.S. to be a matter of national security, so we can move forward with disposition.

Several Board members pointed out that plutonium has been added to high-level nuclear waste in the past, and that this method could be used for the disposal of fissile materials. Mr. Butler Derrick asserted that the delays associated with the Defense Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River should not serve as an example of what can be done with vitrification in terms of time and cost. Other Board members contended that it is not yet known whether plutonium could be easily recovered from the vitrified or ceramic encasing.

Mr. Dan Dudek argued in favor of the Administration making a high level public relations campaign to discuss what some might interpret as a change in U.S. policy on MOx. He suggested that a public relations campaign at the highest levels of the Administration would be needed to educate the American public about the national security imperatives of fissile material disposition, and to distinguish the differences between a closed fuel cycle, and the once-through burning of plutonium for disposition purposes.

Conclusions

At 6:00 pm EST, Chairman Hanfling summarized the points the Board would like to emphasize in its transmittal of the letter report to the Secretary:

1. Plutonium disposition is a National Security issue;
2. Whatever option is chosen must transparent, irreversible, and done in parallel with the Russians;
3. The best option includes vitrification as well as burning of MOx fuel, the hybrid option;
4. Something must be done NOW.

Mr. Hanfling asked whether any Board Members had any further comments, and indicated that written comments should be submitted to him as soon as possible in order for them to be considered for inclusion in the letter to the Secretary. Chairman Hanfling's question on whether there were any more comments was met with silence, and he stated that in this instance, silence meant unanimous consent. Thus, the report of the Task Force was approved by the Board.

Chairman Hanfling then asked whether any members of the public had any questions, which was also met by silence.

The meeting was concluded with a brief discussion about agenda items for the December 3, 1996, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board meeting in Washington, D.C. Chairman Hanfling solicited comments from SEAB members on major items for the agenda, which is expected to highlight the accomplishments of DOE and the SEAB over the past four years, and recommendations for the next four years.

Adjournment

Chairman Hanfling adjourned the teleconference at 6:05 PM EDT.